Political Economy of the Genesis of Authoritarianism in Türkiye in the 21st Century

My deeper engagement with the political economy of Türkiye began after teaching POLS310: Türkiye and its Neighbours at the University of Otago in early 2023. Although I had long followed the country’s evolving economic and political dynamics—including shifts in growth regimes, patterns of capital accumulation, and its place in global capitalism—teaching the course offered fresh perspectives. It sharpened my understanding of Türkiye’s political landscape and deepened my interest in the intersection of foreign policy, political economy, and cultural politics.

Between 2019 and 2022, I contributed to academic discussions on Turkish politics through conference presentations, newspaper commentary, and university seminars in Aotearoa New Zealand. Building on this foundation, my current research agenda focuses on producing empirically grounded, high-quality scholarship on the critical political economy of contemporary Türkiye. Central to this work is an exploration of how authoritarianism has taken root and evolved—through state-led redistribution, strategic use of election cycles, and the growing ideological and material influence of the military-industrial complex, particularly in the post-pandemic era.

Research Topic

In the past decade, a substantial body of literature has emerged, offering profound insights into the metamorphosis of Türkiye’s political economic regime. This transformation is justified by the adoption of frameworks of neoliberal authoritarianism, neoliberal populism, and authoritarian populism. While debates persist on the defining features of the regime, an array of studies has keenly directed attention towards understanding how these features resonate with the repercussions of global capitalist crises, particularly the shifts in capital accumulation models, notably prominent post the 2000s, post-2008 and post-pandemic periods.

Within this framework, Türkiye’s political economic regime is observed drawing inspiration from global trends, transitioning initially towards a financially dependent model (2001-2008), then having a destabilization period (2009-2019), finally shifting to export-oriented, semi-developmental, hybrid growth model (2019-present). The influx of capital systematically neoliberalised the foundational structures of capitalism in Türkiye, starting in the late 1970s. This historical process witnessed a renewed wave of neoliberalisation in the early 2000s under AKP governments, eroding the foundations of the resilient labour regime (whose revival was predominant in the 1990s), contributing to gradual de-industrialization, and deeply financializing households while privatizing fundamental components of the Turkish economy. Although this neoliberal trajectory shaped Türkiye’s macroeconomic profile for nearly a decade, especially post the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the country entered a subsequent phase where neoliberalisation continued amidst the evolution of authoritarianism.

Background

The late 1990s saw Türkiye’s integration with the EU, accompanied by political and legal reforms that refined the country’s image as a democratizing nation. While AKP governments benefited from the recovery of the country’s political image, they also navigated the financial stability created by preceding governments, IMF standby agreements, and capital inflows. This period of restoration in the 2000s solidified AKP’s electoral popularity and entrenched the party in the Turkish political regime, allowing it to redefine the political landscape.

However, by the end of the 2000s, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-8 left a significant impact on countries following the dependent financialization model, necessitating substantial restructuring of their economies. In the Turkish context, this crisis marked a turning point around mid-2013, where the Fed’s taper tantrum signalled the discontinuity of the financialized dependent model. Simultaneously, dissatisfaction among the masses in Türkiye found expression in the Gezi Park protests, further escalating political instability.

In addressing democratic challenges and confronting a crisis within the prevailing growth model, governments led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) embarked on a controversial and gradual path towards establishing an overtly authoritarian regime. The emergence of authoritarian tendencies can be interpreted as an effort to preserve unity and order within the growth model, particularly in alignment with the interests of all factions of the capitalist class. This inclination was closely linked to the imperative of the ruling political elites to safeguard and consolidate their power and authority. The process of authoritarianization entailed the implementation of consolidation mechanisms that justified the diminishing influence of the parliamentary system, civil society, and organized labour. The period spanning from 2014 to 2018 witnessed the AKP’s concerted endeavours to solidify its dominance within both the state apparatus and the political landscape, ultimately culminating in the formal establishment of a presidential system subsequent to the failed coup attempt in 2016.

Contemporary authoritarianism in Türkiye is distinct, marked by its success in entrenching specific mechanisms beyond ideological influence and state power. The current regime has achieved a near-monopoly over critical social reproduction mechanisms, evident in the establishment of the presidential system and control over the entire bureaucracy and military. Through these means, the AKP regime exerts substantial influence, effectively gatekeeping the conditions necessary for social reproduction that citizens require to sustain their lives.

Crisis, Control, and the Authoritarian Growth Model

Despite the historical roots of authoritarianism in Türkiye, contemporary challenges emerged with the implementation of the presidential system, rendering the already problematic capital accumulation model extremely vulnerable to global shocks. The attempt to repoliticize economic management, initially intended to revive control over the economy, backfired, leading to a currency crisis in mid-2018.

The subsequent currency shock forced Türkiye to regain full control of economic management, intervening through orthodox economic policies. The impact of this shock, however, persisted, resulting in disruptions to Türkiye’s economic growth, including bankruptcies, increased already problematic unemployment, and escalated the economic downturn. The consequences were reflected in the 2019 municipal elections, where the AKP faced challenges in major metropolitan districts.

The COVID-19 pandemic provided temporary relief to economic pressures, allowing Türkiye to recover lost growth. However, by the last quarter of 2021, a second currency shock unfolded, prompting the AKP to lower interest rates dramatically. This move triggered a systemic crisis, leading to a significant devaluation of the Turkish lira. In response, the regime shifted its focus towards shielding its traditional voter base from inflationary impacts, focusing on new employment creation to maintain hegemony.

By the conclusion of 2022, the intricate political-economic landscape in Türkiye was characterized by a pervasive uncertainty, underscored by a notably weak growth projection and concerning fluctuations in the central bank balance. The capitalist class exhibited a discernible divergence, with a pronounced shift towards disparate political-economic policies, a schism that only became glaringly evident in the 2021-22 period. Within this stratified class, some entities associated with the traditional bourgeoisie adeptly capitalized on their access to global financial markets stressing the price stability and sustainable growth, while others increasingly associated with SME’s, and export traders, on the prevailing conditions of low-interest rates, devalued lira and dynamic credit circulation. This internal polarization unveiled the intricate dynamics shaping the Turkish political economy. The culmination of an inflationary growth model reached its zenith, exacerbating income inequality and undermining the consumption power of the masses. This, in turn, restricted their ability to borrow and heightened the vulnerability of their employment prospects. Despite the advantageous conditions for opposition forces, especially after the devastating destruction of the Maras earthquake which revealed all the defects of the neoliberal growth model and incapacity of the state to respond national crises;  political parties in opposition failed to articulate a clear trajectory for either the capitalist or working classes, reflecting a nuanced challenge in navigating the complex and multifaceted political-economic landscape of Türkiye during this pivotal period.

The authoritarian consolidation efforts reached a critical juncture in the 2023 general and presidential elections. The regime employed divisive strategies and wielded state power to prevent opposition unity, ensuring its continued dominance. The outcome of these elections marked the end of the authoritarian consolidation phase, revealing the regime’s adaptability in utilizing both ideological hegemony and political economic instruments to maintain power. Post-election, the AKP returned to orthodox economic policies, underscoring how the previous heterodox program served the purpose of authoritarian consolidation rather than genuine economic stability.

The significance attributed to the 2023 elections emanates from their dual function as a manifestation of the regime’s adept control over the political landscape and as a mirror reflecting the strategic utilization of economic policies for political objectives. These elections served as a conspicuous illustration of the regime’s proficiency in navigating challenges by artfully manipulating economic narratives to sustain its hegemonic position, even if such strategies entailed the possibility of transitory economic relief or fluctuations. Furthermore, the AKP-Erdoğan administrations exemplified, through the strategic deployment of economic and social policies, how authoritarian consolidation aligns with prevailing post-pandemic trends in the global political economy. This alignment is evident in the emphasis on employment generation, discerning state investments in strategic sectors, dedication to enhancing manufacturing and logistical infrastructure, and a focus on the military-industrial complex to bolster export trade.

The Post-2023 Conjuncture: “Return” to Neoliberal Orthodoxy and Rising Opposition

Following its 2023 electoral victory, the Erdoğan administration abruptly shifted course and re-embraced a neoliberal orthodoxy program. This pivot aimed to restore investor confidence and stabilize macroeconomic fundamentals through a suite of classical neoliberal tools: fiscal discipline, wage suppression, central bank independence (in form if not substance), accumulation of foreign reserves, controlled interest rate increases, and reduced state subsidies. The regime also sought to reintegrate into global financial markets, signaling a pragmatic—if temporary—retreat from heterodoxy.

However, this reorientation came at a political cost. Austerity measures began to erode the AKP’s social base, particularly among urban working classes who had benefited from earlier distributive policies. This opened a significant opportunity for opposition parties, especially the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which began to leverage the institutional power of local governments it had gained in the 2019 municipal elections.

In the 2024 municipal elections, the opposition made historic gains, recapturing major metropolitan municipalities and extending influence into traditionally conservative regions. By using municipal resources to shield citizens from the effects of inflation and wage erosion—through targeted subsidies, social services, and employment support—the opposition effectively turned the regime’s own political-economic tactics against it. These victories not only challenged AKP’s long-standing urban dominance but also shattered the illusion of its invincibility.

Authoritarian Retrenchment and Strategic Repression (2025–)

The backlash was swift. In 2025, facing the erosion of urban control and mounting opposition legitimacy, the Erdoğan government intensified authoritarian measures to reassert dominance. Political space began to narrow rapidly. New waves of repression targeted opposition leaders, journalists, municipal administrators, and associated business networks. Legal and bureaucratic mechanisms were deployed to undermine elected opposition figures—reminiscent of earlier waves of authoritarian entrenchment post-2016.

This period also reflected broader global trends: the weakening of the liberal international order, the retreat of globalization, and the resurgence of autocratic power politics. The Erdoğan administration weaponized this global climate of instability to justify domestic crackdowns, further entrenching executive dominance while abandoning the temporary economic stabilization that had followed the 2023 elections.

The regime’s renewed authoritarian push, however, came at the expense of macroeconomic recovery. Fiscal discipline was once again sacrificed for political expediency, credit controls were loosened to engineer temporary growth, and wage increases were selectively deployed to regain electoral loyalty. In doing so, the regime destabilized the delicate balance it had momentarily achieved post-2023, revealing the fragility of its own consolidation.

With this research, I aim to unveil the mechanisms underlying authoritarian transformation, emphasizing the role of political economic instruments, redistribution mechanisms, and ideological hegemony in sustaining and consolidating the regime’s power in the 21st century, particularly focusing on the post-pandemi period. By delving into these intricate dynamics, the study seeks to contribute nuanced insights into the complex interplay between economic policies and political dynamics that have shaped Türkiye’s current state of affairs.

Research Questions

  1. How do political economic instruments, mechanisms of redistribution, and ideological hegemony coalesce to fortify authoritarian consolidation in 21st-century Türkiye?
    • What constitutes the spectrum of political economic instruments under the AKP-Erdoğan regime, and how are they conceptualized, developed, and differentiated across conjunctures?
    • How has the operationalization of these instruments evolved across different phases of AKP rule, particularly in response to external crises (e.g., 2008 financial crisis, COVID-19, post-2023 economic instability)?
    • What novel political economic instruments—such as targeted credit schemes, militarized industrial expansion, or provincial employment programs—have been mobilized to entrench authoritarian governance?
  2. How does the AKP’s response to the global impacts of the global stagnation and slow growth in the post-pandemic period align with the authoritarian restructuring of the Turkish regime?
    • In what manner have mechanisms of wealth redistribution evolved and been employed to support the chosen growth model?
    • In what ways does the AKP ideologize political economic instruments to legitimize its growth trajectory and development discourse?
  3. How does the Erdoğan administration’s post-2023 “return” to neoliberal orthodoxy reflect broader global economic and political shifts (e.g., rising interest rates, return of austerity, crisis of globalization)?
    • How has this neoliberal pivot contributed to internal contradictions within the regime’s social base and created space for new political challenges?
  4. How does the post-2024 narrowing of the political field reflect a transition from a phase of authoritarian consolidation—characterized by the management of a contradictory and internally unstable capitalist power bloc—toward a more centralized political-economic regime in which the state seeks to subsume intra-class tensions through direct disciplinary governance (marking a shift in hegemonic strategy and the mode of capitalist regulation)?

Primary Purpose & Main Assumptions

My research investigates the political economy of authoritarian transformation in Türkiye, with particular emphasis on the post-pandemic period and the shifting dynamics after the 2023 elections. It focuses on how the state strategically mobilizes political economic instruments—including redistribution mechanisms, employment policies, and the military-industrial complex—within an evolving regime structure that seeks to stabilize hegemony under conditions of global uncertainty and internal class contradictions. By tracing the transition from neoliberalisation to authoritarian consolidation and to a more tightly controlled political-economic management, I examine how the authoritarian regime has adapted its strategies to manage, discipline, and eventually restructure its relationship with competing fractions of capital and popular classes.

My research proceeds from the assumption that authoritarian rule in Türkiye is not merely an ideological project or a response to democratic erosion, but a material process shaped by the imperatives of capital accumulation, intra-class conflict, and the state’s role as a mediator and increasingly as a dominant actor in economic coordination. My research aligns with traditions of critical political economy that foreground the role of state apparatuses in reorganizing class power, particularly under conditions of global capitalist volatility.

Potential Outcomes

My research is expected to yield several significant outcomes. I aim to offer a detailed empirical mapping of the political economic instruments deployed by the AKP–Erdoğan administration, particularly in the post-pandemic and post-2023 periods, showing how these tools have been recalibrated in response to global economic turbulence and shifting domestic political dynamics. The study will provide theoretical insights into authoritarian governance as a dynamic and adaptive process—one that navigates internal contradictions within the capitalist class while reconfiguring state–society relations to maintain control. I also seek to contribute to comparative political economy debates by demonstrating how Türkiye selectively integrates global trends—such as fiscal orthodoxy, austerity, employment restructuring, and militarization—within a distinctively authoritarian framework. In doing so, I analyse redistributive mechanisms like employment programs, urban subsidies, and targeted social assistance not only as economic tools but as core elements of ideological hegemony. By exploring how the opposition’s appropriation of these instruments in the 2024 municipal elections disrupted the regime’s monopoly over political-economic narratives, my research sheds light on how authoritarian power can be contested through local and redistributive channels. Ultimately, I hope to deepen our understanding of the relationship between economic policymaking and authoritarian statecraft in the context of ongoing global capitalist volatility.

Berkay Koçak, PhD

Political Scientist & Policy Analyst